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CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN TENANCIES BY THE
ENTIRETIES
RICHARD G. HUBER*
Anachronisms are not uncommon in property law but the con-
tinuing existence in many states of tenancies by the entireties is an
extreme example of feudal remnants in modern law.' Study of the
ancient land law has a certain charm as an historical exercise. But
when a remnant of this law guides our conduct today, three obvious
questions arise: (1) Does this ancient estate have any present value?
(2) If not, or only partially, is abolition essential or will modification
suffice?, and (3) Have those jurisdictions retaining the estate made
any modifications modernizing its effects and incidents? The rights
of creditors are certainly not the sole element to be considered in the
determination as to whether ancient estates should be retained, but
they definitely are major factors. The recent New Jersey decision
of King v. Greene 2 has again raised the issue of the rights of creditors
in estates held by the entireties and focused attention on the necessity
for a re-appraisal of the value of this type of land holding.
THE ANCIENT ESTATE
The historical estate known as the tenancy by the entirety varies
from the modern holding so denominated in most jurisdictions retain-
ing the concept. Modern variations, however, can only be understood
in the background of the ancient estate and thus a brief review of
well-known facts may be helpful. The essential ingredient of the
ancient tenancy was that, when spouses took property at common
law, the husband's control over the concurrent estate was absolute
during coverture. Since property solely owned by the woman prior
to marriage came under the complete control, both as to management
and benefit, of the husband upon marriage, a wife's rights in concur-
rently owned property acquired during coverture was similarly
limited. This common law policy is generally expressed as: The hus-
band and wife are one and the one is the husband.' The common law
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. B.S. 1941, U.S. Naval Academy;
J.D. 1950, State University of Iowa; LL.M. 1951, Harvard University.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Miss Elizabeth A. Porada, Re-
search Librarian, Boston College Law School, in the preparation of this comment.
1 Abolition of the estate was called for in the Report of the Committee on Changes
in Substantive Real Property Principles, Real Property and Trust Law Division, A.B.A.
(1944). See also 2 American Law of Property § 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952).
2 30 N.J. 395, 153 Aid 49 (1959).
See, e.g., Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temp. L.Q. 24, 25 (1951).
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also favored survivorship in concurrent, ownership' so it was not sur-
prising that concurrent estates in the marital unity of husband and
wife had as an incident a right in the survivor to take the entire estate
on the spouse's death. Thus, the tenancy by the entirety so developed
that, although a transfer of property was made to husband and wife,
the husband had complete' control during the marriage while the sur-
vivor took the entire granted estate upon death of the other spouse.°
During coverture, the, wife's interest was only an expectancy.°
THE MODERN ESTATE '
While the term, "modern estate by the entirety," may be a
contradiction in terms, the form, in which it survives in jurisdictions
retaining it determines the rights of creditors in the estate. Whether
the estate exists is itself a difficult question to determine in some
jurisdictions. There are holdings or intimations confirming or sug-
gesting its existence in about half the states. But in some jurisdic-
tions the estate if it does exist, is either seldom used, or its incidents
are such that it should properly be classified as a joint tenancy. The
estate by the entirety has been recognized in Arkansas,? Delaware, 8
District of Columbia,° Florida," Hawafi," Indiana," Kentucky,"
4 The common law presumption was that a concurrent estate transferred to other
than husband and wife created a joint tenancy, not a tenancy in common. This, of
course, tended to return the entire property involved to single ownership and thus
complied with the important feudal policy against breaking up obligations to the
overlord among a number of tenants. See 4 Powell, Real Property ¶ 602 (1954), and
authorities there cited.
5 Ordinarily the interest in the property that is transferred by the entireties has
been a fee simple, but this is not a requirement. The tenancy can be created in any
estate in land that is capable of being owned by the husband and wife subject to
survivorship. 2 American Law of Property § 6.6 (Casner ed. 1952).
8 Thus the husband (1) had the exclusive right to occupy the principal and enjoy
the income of the entire property; (2) had the power to manage, control and dispose
of the possession and income during the marriage; (3) had the benefit of all the assets
for use as a base for credit; and (4) was alone entitled to represent the asset or any
part thereof in litigation, But the husband alone could not destroy the wife's right of
survivorship. Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temp. L.Q. 24, 25-26 (1951). Note
that the result of the ancient estate was essentially no different than if the property
had been given entirely to the wife, as long as the marriage continued, or if the wife
survived the husband. The only difference occurred when the husband survived the
wife, since he would then have full ownership, not just curtesy during his life with
the estate going on his death to the heirs of his former wife.
7 Branch v. Polk, 61 Ark. 388, 33 S.W. 424 (1895).
8 Citizens' Saving Bank v. Astrin, 44 Del. 451, 61 A.2d 419 (1948).
9 Fairclaw v. Forest, 130 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
10 Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920).
11 Peters v. Alsup, 95 F. Supp. 684 (D. Haw. 1951).
12 Baker v. Cailor, 206 Ind. 440, 186 N.E. 769 (1933).
13 Hoffman v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607 (1932).
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Maryland," Massachusetts," Michigan," Missouri,' Montana,"
New jersey," New York," North Carolina," Oregon,22 Pennsyl-
vania," Rhode Island,24 Tennessee," Vermont,' Virginia,27 and
Wyoming.28 It exists by statute in Mississippi," but no cases deter-
mine its incidents. Oklahoma" and Utah" recognize it nominally in
statutes, but the incidents of the estate are identical with those of a
joint tenancy." There is an intimation in a recent note that the estate
could exist in Iowa," but its .existence has been denied by the state
Supreme Court.'
Only Massachusetts retains the tenancy in its ancient common
law form." Elsewhere modern legislation, community property prin-
ciples, or public policy have either resulted in holdings that the estate
does not exist or that it has new and different incidents." The major
reason for the change in these jurisdictions still retaining it, has been
the enactment of Married Women's Property Acts. By permitting a
wife to hold and control her property, these acts undermine the basic
theory of the tenancy by the entirety that the spouses form a single
unity whose property is completely under the control of the husband.
In some states this change of policy resulted in the reasonable con-
clusion that the tenancy no longer existed." In others, however, the
tenancy still remained in modified form. Thus, in some states, the
holding became the equivalent of a tenancy in common during the
joint lives of the spouses, although the right of survivorship continued
14 Keen v. Keen, 191 Md. 31, 60 A.2d 200 (1948).
15 Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929).
16 Dickey v. Converse, 117 Mich. 449, 76 N.W. 80 (1898).
17 Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918).
18 In re Marsh's Estate, 125 Mont. 239, 234 P.2d 459 (1951).
10 Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N.J.Eq. 651, 9 ALL 695 (Ct. Err. & App. 1887).
20 Hiles v. Fisher, 14 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895).
21 Hood v. Mercer, 150 N.C. 699, 64 S.E. 897 (1909).
22 Ganoe v. Ohmart, 121 Ore. 116, 254 Pac. 203 (1927).
28 United States Nat'l Bank v. Penrod, 354 Pa. 170, 47 A.2d 249 (1946).
24 Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 25 A.2d 354 (1942).
25 Cole Manufacturing Co. v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31 S.W. 1000 (1895).
26 Town of Corinth v. Emery, 63 Vt. 505, 22 Ad. 618 (1841).
27 Allen V. Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 139 S.E. 615 (1929).
28 Peters v. Dona, 49 Wyo. 306, 54 P.2d 817 (1936).
29 Miss. Code Ann. § 834 (1942).
30 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 74 (1941).
31 Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-5 (1953).
32 See Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temp. L.Q. 24, 33 (1951).
33 Note, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 169, 180 (1958).
34 Fay v. Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N.W. 369 (1926).
35 Michigan and North Carolina also retain the common law form of the tenancy
except on the one issue of creditor's rights. 4 Powell, Real Property ¶ 623 (1954).
36 In some states, of course, the very paucity of cases interpreting tenancies by the
entireties has prevented any full exposition of all incidents of the estate.
37 4 Powell, Real Property ¶ 621 (1954).
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to exist indestructible except by voluntary act of both spouses or
termination of the marriage. In other states the main result of modi-
fication has been to change one or more the estate's incidents, induct-
ing the rights of creditors of either spouse to reach the property of
the tenancy.
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS
Common law rule. As previously noted the husband at common
law completely controlled property held by the entireties, and re-
ceived all benefits therefrom. Since he could use his interest as a
present base for credit, his creditors could reach his entire interest
in the estate." His estate was, in fact, not unlike a determinable fee
simple; he had complete present property rights which continued so
long as he survived his wife or the marriage continued. His interest,
although involving a future contingency, had considerable present
worth and was a valuable asset available to his creditors. The wife's
interest, although more substantial than dower, was essentially the
same type of contingent interest. To take any beneficial interest the
wife had to survive her husband. Her interest, although indefeasible
without her consent, was a mere expectancy of speculative value, and
was regarded at common law as being unavailable to her creditors.
Massachusetts is the only state continuing to preserve the pure
common law concept of the tenancy. The husband's interest in prop-
erty held by the entireties can be reached by his creditors" but the
wife's cannot." No Massachusetts cases have been found deciding
whether a creditor can reach the property held in such tenancy when
the husband and wife are joint debtors. If their obligations are several
as well as joint, or merely several, the result would be that the hus-
band's but not the wife's interest could be reached. If only joint,
however, although the determination is not free of difficulty, it would
seem that the entire tenancy would be exempt, on the ground that to
reach it at all would require reaching the wife's exempt interest.
Massachusetts has held that one tenant by the entirety can convey his
interest to the other," and that both can convey their interests to a
third person." By analogy, it might be argued that reaching the
entire estate of joint debtors is possible since the tenancy can be
transferred by a joint free act of both spouses. This result would be
reached in most states which hold that a creditor can reach any
transferable interest, but a Massachusetts court would almost certain-
38 See, e.g., the discussion in Washburn v. Burns, 34 N.J.L. 18, 20 (Sup. Ct. 1869).
89 Raptes v. Pappas, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927).
40 Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929).
41 Hale v. Hale, 332 Mass. 329, 125 N.E.2d 142 (1955).
42 Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 156 N.E. 685 (1927).
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ly follow the strict common law concept retained in Massachusetts
which exempts the wife's interest. Thus the somewhat anomalous
result is that, if the husband were sole debtor, or each were severally
liable, creditors could reach his interest, but if he were jointly liable
with his wife, his interest as well as her's would be protected.
All interests reachable rule. In the four jurisdictions holding a
tenancy by the entirety is the same as a tenancy in common for the
joint lives of the spouses with an indefeasible right of survivorship
in each, absolute equality of rights exists in both husband and wife.
Each not only has a right to take the whole as survivor but also has
a present possessory interest with control and income rights. This
has been deemed sufficient to give a creditor of either spouse the right
to go against property held by the entirety to the extent of the debtor-
spouse's interest. A creditor thus proceeding becomes a tenant in
common with the non-debtor spouse. As such he is entitled to the
entire property if the debtor-spouse survives, and conversely loses
all rights if the order of survival is reversed. This has uniformly been
the holding in Arkansas,' New York," and Oregon."
King v. Greene" finally settled the law in New Jersey to conform
to that of these other three states. Prior to the case, the New Jersey
rule was unsettled, no opinion of the highest appellate courts having
decided the issue. However two nisi prius decisions had determined
that, as to the interest of one spouse, only his present right to half
the income and profits of the property could be reached by his cred-
itors, his right of survivorship remaining free of their claims.'" The
court in King v. Greene, analyzing the common law precedents, found
that the husband's interest was reachable by his creditors at common
law. Consequently, if the husband's and wife's interests became equal
43 Moore v. Denson, 167 Ark. 134, 268 S.W. 609 (1924); Branch v. Polk, 61 Ark.
388, 33 S.W. 424 (1895).
44 Hiles v. Fisher, 14 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895) ; Finnegan v. Humes, 252
App. Div. 385, 299 N.Y. Supp. 501 (4th Dep't 1937), aff'd, 277 N.Y. 682, 14 N.E.2d 389
(1938) ; Lover v. Fennell, 14 Misc. 2d 874, 179 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
45 Brownley v. Lincoln County, 343 P.2d 529 (Ore. 1959) ; Canoe v. Ohmart, 121
Ore. 116, 254 Pac. 203 (1927); Howell v. Folsom, 38 Ore. 184, 63 Pac. 116 (1900).
Hawaii is probably in this group although there are no decisions. In Peters v.
Alsup, 95 F. Supp. 684 (D. Flaw. 1951), the court, in discussing the tenancy by the
entirety, quotes First Nat'l Bank v. Gaines, 16 Haw. 731, 733 (1905), to the effect that
the Married Women's Property Act in the territory had destroyed the common law
unity of husband and wife. This would result in a holding that husband and wife
have separate estates in the property, and thus that they hold tenancies in common
during their joint lives with rights of survivorship.
46 30 N.J. 395, 153 A.2d 49 (1959).
47 Zanzonico v. Zanzonico, 24 N.J. Misc. 153, 46 A.2d 565, 166 A.L.R. 964 (Sup.
Ct. 1946) ; Dworan v. Miloszewski, 17 N.J. Super. 269, 88 A.2d 550 (Cty. Ct. 1952).
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upon adoption of the Married Women's Property Act, each interest
should be equally subject to the claims of the individual's creditors.
The original difficulty experienced by the New Jersey courts in
settling this issue of creditors' rights is not surprising. When one
estate is treated analytically as two, i.e., a tenancy in common and
an estate expectant upon survivorship, the two pseudo-estates are
likely to be considered separately. Thus, regarded as a tenancy in
common during the joint lives of the spouses, the present, possessory
and beneficial interests should logically be subjected to creditors'
claims. The difficulty arises when each spouse is regarded as having
an expectant estate contingent upon survivorship. If this interest
were to be treated as a separate estate divorced from the underlying
tenancy in common, the common law rule most nearly analogous is
that which operates to bar creditors of a married woman satisfying
their claims out of her interest in a tenancy by the entirety because
of its contingent nature." As a result the mere expectancies of the
husband and wife in property held by the entirety could not be
reached. But actually each spouse has one estate, not two, and the
expectancy of the spouse is only a portion of his total interest in the
estate, which includes present possessory rights. Analytically the New
Jersey court reached the correct result in King v. Greene, if one ac-
cepts its premise as to the effect of the Married Women's Property
Acts on tenancies by the entireties. The nisi prius decisions did, of
course, avoid sale of speculative contingent interests to settle a cred-
itor's claim—and this might as a de novo matter be an excellent
policy to follow—but they did not recognize the actualities that each
spouse has a single, not a dual, estate in the property.
In these four states, since each spouse's interest can be reached
by his individual creditors, their interests could be reached as a unit
if they were liable to creditors jointly, severally or jointly and
severally.
No interests reachable rule. If the Married Women's Property
Acts are construed to give the wife equal interests with the husband
in an estate held by the entirety, but the tenancy otherwise remains
theoretically the same as at common law, the logical result is that
creditors cannot reach either the husband's or the wife's interest. This
results from the concept of the unity of husband and wife in the
common law estate; each spouse takes no separate estate but together
as a unity they take the whole. When this estate existed at common
law, the husband exercised complete control not because he had an
individual interest but because he represented the marital unity. With
48 See discussion of common law rule in text of the first part of this section.
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the equality of the wife statutorily established however, the husband
loses his right to control and both spouses must now act together as a
single unit, neither individually having any rights of control. Thus
neither spouse can alone receive the income and profits of, nor alone
transfer any interest in, the property. If the property cannot be trans-
ferred except by the concurrent act of both spouses, creditors of either
cannot reach the interest of the debtor-spouse since he has no separate
interest to reach. To permit the creditor of the debtor-spouse to reach
his interest would interfere with the rights, of the other spouse in the
enjoyment of the whole property during the continuance of the estate.
While land held by the entirety can be subjected to a creditor's lien
collectible if the debtor-spouse survives, this interest can be readily
defeated by a conveyance of the property by the two spouses during
coverture. This result can be had since one of the rights of a spouse
in a tenancy by the entirety is to convey the property with the consent
of the other spouse, and courts have generally been unwilling to cut
down the non-debtor-spouse's interests even to the extent of limiting
this right to convey with the consent of the other.
Most states retaining the tenancy by the entirety follow the
theory that the interest of neither husband nor wife can be reached
by a creditor of either. Such is the holding of the courts of Delaware,"
District of Columbia,5° Florida," Indiana," Maryland," Michigan,"
Missouri," North Carolina," Pennsylvania," Rhode Island," Ver-
49 Citizens' Saving Bank v. Astrin, 44 Del. 451, 61 A.2d 419 (1948); Heitz v. Sayers,
32 Del. 207, 121 Atl. 225 (1923).
5° Fairclaw v. Forest, 130 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1942); American Wholesale Corp.
v. Aronstein, 10 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1926).
51- Vaughan v. Mandis, 53 So, 2d 704 (Fla. 1951) ; Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave,
79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920).
52 Baker v. Cailor, 206 Ind. 440, 186 N.E. 769 (1933),
63 Keen v. Keen, 191 Md. 31, 60 A.2d 200 (1948); Masterman v. Masterman,
129 Md. 167, 98 Att. 537 (1916). See also Arnold, Tenancy by the Entireties and
Creditors' Rights in Maryland, 9 Md. L. Rev. 291 (1948).
54 American State Trust Co. v. Rosenthal, 255 Mich. 157, 237 N.W. 534 (1931);
Dickey v. Converse, 117 Mich. 449, 76 N.W. 80 (1898). Cf. Glazer v. Beer, 343 Mich.
495, 72 N.W.2d 141 (1955), where it was held that a husband's interest in a tenancy
by the entirety could be reached under Mich. Comp. Laws § 566.14 which has been
interpreted to prohibit enhancement of a tenancy by the entirety during insolvency.
The husband, with no other assets than property held by the entirety, borrowed con-
siderable sums which he spent in improving the entirety property. The creditors were
permitted to proceed against his interest because of these special facts.
55 Otto F. Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918) ;
Hanebrink v. Tower Grove Bank and Trust Co., 321 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
50 Edwards v. Arnold, 250 N.C. 500, 109 S,E.2d 205 (1959); Hood v. Mercer,
150 N.C. 699, 64 S.E. 897 (1909); Bruce v. Sugg, 109 N.C. 202, 13 S.E. 790 (1891).
Contra, Lewis v. Pate, 21 N.C. 253, 193 S.E. 20 (1937), a per curiam decision holding
that the husband's creditors could sell crops raised on a tenancy by the entirety; later
cases ignore but do not overrule the decision.
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mont,°° Virginia," and Wyoming." Montana probably also accepts
this view." The law in Mississippi is uncertain but there is a weak
inference in an early case that this view would be accepted.° 3
The recognition in these states that the husband and wife can
join together to transfer all their interest in a tenancy by the entirety
permits creditors of joint-debtor-spouses to reach the estate. If the
spouses are only severally liable, however, the creditors have no rights
in the estate.
Right of survivorship reachable rule. In those states holding that
no interest of either spouse in a tenancy by the entirety is reachable
by the spouse's creditors, the result rests on the theory, as indicated
above, that the rights of the non-debtor spouse would otherwise be
jeopardized. This theory does not, of course, consider the right of
survivorship as separate from the present possessory estate in the
marital unity, except to the extent of acknowledging that a lien may
be attached to the survivorship right effective only if the debtor-
spouse survives or otherwise takes the property. The right of sur-
vivorship can, however, be treated separately and, if it is, this right
can be transferred by one spouse without in any substantial way
affecting the rights of the other. Both spouses retain their present
possessory interests during coverture and if the non-transferring
spouse survives he will have the entire estate. The only right lost by
the non-transferring spouSe is the right to join with the other to
transfer the entire estate which, although clearly a right of some value,
is not a major incident of this form of ownerhip. Thus, if the right
of survivorship is transferable by one spouse acting without the
consent of the other, creditors of each spouse should be able to reach
this right. This result has been reached in Tennessee' and Ken-
tucky,' in the latter primarily on the basis of statute." The major
57 Amadon v. Amadon, 359 Pa. 434, 59 A.2d 135 (1948); United States National
Bank v. Penrod, 354 Pa. 170, 47 A.2d 249 (1946).
58
 Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 25 A.2d 354 (1942).
56 Citizens' Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Jenkins, 91 Vt. 13, 99 Atl. 250 (1916);
Town of Corinth v. Emery, 63 Vt. 505, 2 Atl. 618 (1891).
60
 Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951); Allen v. Parkey, 154
Va. 739, 149 S.E. 615 (1929).
61
 Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 75 Wyo. 444, 297 P.2d 213 (1956); Peters v. Dona,
49 Wyo. 306, 54 P.2d 817 (1936).
62
 In re Marsh's Estate, 125 Mont. 239, 234 P.2d 459 (1951) (inference only).
la McDuff v. Beauchamp, 50 Miss. 531 (1874).
64
 Sloan v. Sloan, 182 Tenn. 162, 184 S.W.2d 391 (1945); Cole Manufacturing Co.
v. Collier, 95 Tenn. 115, 31 S.W. 1000 (1895). The opinion in the Cole Manufacturing
Co. case indicates that Tennessee probably adopted this rule under a miscornprehension
of the holdings of courts in other states on this issue.
65
 Hoffman v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607 (1932).
66
 Ky. Rev, Stat. Ann. § 426.190 (1955), which describes the interest that a
defendant must have before land is liable for execution.
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result of the holdings in these states is that a present right is given
to creditors; conveyance of the estate by the spouses during their
joint lives cannot defeat the right of the creditor to proceed against
the estate if the debtor-spouse survives.
In these two states, although there is no authority so holding,
it would seem that creditors of joint-debtor-spouses should be able
to reach their entire interest in property held by the entirety. If the
spouses are only severally liable, only their individually transferable
interests, i.e., their rights of survivorship, could be reached.
Federal bankruptcy law. The virtually complete immunity from
claims of creditors given to tenants by the entireties in a majority of
states retaining the tenancy is an expression of policy generally favor-
ing marital property and property interests over commercial and
creditor interests. The Bankruptcy Act on the other hand, being
designed to aid creditors and the commercial community, has imposed
a limitation upon this common state policy of immunity. Section
70a(7) of the Act,' added in 1938, provides that if an interest in
real property nonassignable prior to bankruptcy becomes assigriable
within six months thereafter, it will vest in the trustee. Thus, if the
tenancy is ended by the death of the non-bankrupt spouse, the bank-
rupt's interest will pass to his trustee. It would seem, however, that
the result could be avoided by a conveyance of the property by both
spouses prior to the death of the non-bankrupt,°8 and it is unlikely
that the bankrupt's gain from the conveyance would be capturable
by the trustee on other grounds. When both spouses individually
become bankrupt, it has been held that a tenancy by the entirety will
pass to the trustee by consolidating the proceedings." In the absence
of consolidation the full value of the property is listed as an asset
in the estate of each bankrupt for the determination of solvency on
the date pertinent to the vesting of a creditor's lien. 70
APPRAISAL AND CONCLUSIONS
The retention of the tenancy by the entirety has resulted, except
in a few states, in a partial or nearly total exemption of the property
from the claims of creditors. Is this a desirable social and legal result?
The only apparent direct benefit is that the marital community is
assured of some available resources for support. The state is thus
67 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1I0a(7) (1958).
88
 Bankruptcy Act § 70d(1), 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended 11 U.S.C.
	 II0d(1)
(1958).
66
 In re Carpenter, 5 F. Supp. 101 (M.D. Pa. 1933) (husband and wife jointly
liable so under Pennsylvania law creditors could have reached entirety interest if bank-
ruptcy had not intervened).
To In re Black, 145 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Va. 1956) (Virginia law applied).
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pro tanto free of the obligation to support an indigent family. This
may be particularly important to the wife who thus has an assured
amount of property on her husband's death. In a broader sense, the
exemption reflects a policy favoring the preservation of property
interests over commercial use of property as a base for credit or as
an article of commerce itself. But even if it is granted that these
policies are sound, does the exemption of the tenancy from the claims
of creditors accomplish the desired results? It is believed not. Any
amount of property may be put into this form of holding, free from
creditors' claims although its value well exceeds any reasonable
amounts necessary for support. While, of course, many persons may
be aware of the benefit of this type of ownership and act accordingly,
many others having a greater need for protection will not be so
guided. Thus there can be no assurance of equality of treatment
since much depends upon whether the spouses were sufficiently fore-
sighted to take property in this form. As to the elimination of prop-
erty so held as a base for commercial credit, the general effect of
many such ownerships in a state will be to reduce credit and hence
limit commercial activity.
Are there means readily available by which the valid portion of
the policies favoring restrictions on creditors' rights in property held
by a marital community may be effectuated while avoiding excessive
restrictions on their rights? There should be a financial limit on the
exemption, a limit determined by the requirements of the marital
unity for a home and support. There should be a satisfactory way
of giving the necessitous widow priority over creditors of her deceased
husband. There should be uniform application of the limitation on
creditors' rights. Those states retaining the tenancy by the entirety
but permitting creditors of each spouse to reach his half possessory
interest and his right of survivorship have at least partly solved the
problem. There the non-debtor-spouse's interest is protected while
the debtor-spouse is still able to use his interest in the estate as a
base for credit. But the rule of these states is unsatisfactory in other
respects: the non-debtor-spouse's exempt interest is not limited in
amount or value; the application of the exemption depends upon the
accident of the form of ownership rather than upon any direct social
policy of preserving some exempt marital assets; the debtor-spouse
is not protected at all if he is the survivor and as such the one who
requires some protection from the claims of his creditors.
The social policy favoring 'protection of the marital community
from creditors can best be obtained by the use of devices other than
the . tenancy by the entirety. The tenancy no longer serves a useful
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social function and the legal consequences of its use are, in many
cases, difficult to justify. It should be abolished. Protection of the
marital community could be more readily assured by other existing
although presently somewhat inadequate devices. Homestead and
personal property exemption statutes, modernized as to content and
values, should provide protection for the marital community during
its existence. Upon its termination by death, the widow and possibly
the widower should be given priority over creditors in the assets of
the estate, up to a reasonable support value determined in part by
other assets available to the survivor, the number of dependents, and
the earning capacity of the survivors. Special rules might have to
be developed with respect to personal property subject to security
interests. It is believed that with appropriate legislation drawn with
particular attention to these and other special problems better pro-
tection could be afforded the surviving members of the family of the
decedent without undue prejudice to the just claims of creditors and
the needs of the commercial community.
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